Glossary

What the leading challenger has actually put at risk: the realizable TAO value of the alpha they have locked. Bigger means a more committed challenger.

Shown at realizable value on purpose, because face value overstates the commitment on a thin pool. Only meaningful when the leader is an outsider, which is served alongside as a flag. The field is named after the owner but carries the leader's position, and the leader is not always the owner.

How much of the subnet the current leader of the ownership race has locked up, as a share of supply. Locking alpha is how a key stakes its claim to owning the subnet.

This is the leader's position, and the leader (the "king") is not always the owner: the king_is_owner flag served alongside says which, while comparing the king (a hotkey) with the owner (a coldkey) cannot tell. Conviction is an alpha mass, not an abstract score, which is what makes it comparable to supply at all. It decays over time, but the chain does not keep it up to date on its own: the stored value only moves when something touches the lock, so the figure served here is rolled forward to a recent block every few minutes. Perpetually locked alpha never loses mass and its conviction converges upward to that mass instead. Two half-lives drive it, one for the unlock schedule and one for maturation; both are governance parameters and the maturation one has already been moved off its default, so read the two half-life fields served alongside. This gauge is measured against total supply, while the takeover gate below is measured against the eligible alpha (what is held outside the pool, minus the protocol's own and the burned alpha): two neighbouring bars, two different denominators.

How concentrated the holders are, on a 0 to 100% scale. 0% means the stake is spread perfectly evenly, 100% means one holder owns everything. Lower is healthier.

Shares are per wallet, summed across every validator that wallet delegates to. The owner exclusion is per position, not per wallet: a position drops out only when the holder, the validator it is staked to and the subnet owner are the same coldkey, so the owner's delegations to outside validators are still counted. Most explorers publish the raw HHI rather than this min-normalised form, so the numbers are not comparable. Returns 0 below 2 holders. Recomputed on a 2-hourly cycle, so it can lag the live table, and if that read fails it holds its last good value rather than dropping to zero.

The alpha locked across every participant in the ownership race, shown both at face value and at what it would actually fetch if sold.

A perpetual lock keeps its alpha until its owner switches it to decaying; decaying locks give it back gradually. Realizable values are single AMM exits, so per-holder figures do not add up to the subnet total: use the subnet-level value for "everything sold at once". The fee used is a flat 0.05% rather than the subnet's own, which the chain stores per subnet and governance can change, so on a subnet whose fee has been moved the realizable figure is slightly off.

The smallest number of top holders who together own more than half of the stake. Lower means more concentrated.

Same owner exclusion as HHI. Returns 0 (not 1) for an empty or single-holder subnet.

All the alpha staked on the subnet, i.e. everything held outside the pool.

Careful with the word reserve: the pool's alpha reserve is the other figure (see In Pool). This one is everything outside the pool, and it is broader than "what holders own": it includes the owner's locked and self-staked alpha, the alpha orphaned by past burns (a burn does not shrink it), and alpha the protocol itself bought through chain buys. Locking changes nothing here either, since a lock only blocks withdrawal and moves no tokens. The owner-excluded distribution behind HHI / Nakamoto / Top 10% is a separate calculation.

Two conditions must both hold before the chain will hand a subnet to the conviction leader: the subnet must be over a year old, and the leader alone must hold more than 18% of the eligible alpha in conviction. Threshold met is how full that second condition is.

Only the leader is measured, never the sum of the lockers: a coalition has to lock onto the challenger's own hotkey to count. The comparison is strict, so exactly 18% loses, and both conditions are evaluated together once per epoch rather than every block. The 18% is fixed in the runtime, not a governance parameter, but the bar it sets moves with the eligible alpha, and mostly downwards: issuance raises it every day, while burning alpha shrinks the eligible base faster. So a gauge that moves on its own while nobody touches a lock is the normal case, not a bug. The bar can read above 100% for a while when a decaying lock is near its peak, without the gate being durably reachable; see the ceiling described under Time to takeover. Whether the chain actually executes the flip depends on the runtime version, which takeover_enforced reports: while it is false the conditions are computed but nothing happens. Even then the flip is not automatic: the chain also requires the leader to resolve to a real wallet, whose coldkey is not already the owner's, and eligible to hold a slot on the subnet.

A one-word verdict on the ownership race: whether the gate can ever be reached with the locks as they stand, whether both gates are already satisfied, and whether the chain would act on it.

Stalled is not the same as "far away": it means waiting cannot get there, only a new lock can, either because the current locks plateau below the bar or because the bar climbs past a plateau that sits above it today. A subnet can sit above 100% on the Threshold met bar without being eligible: the age lock is then what holds it back. Even when eligible, the flip only happens at the next epoch, only if enforcement is on, and only if the leader is a different wallet from the current owner.

How long the current locks would need to put a single hotkey over the conviction gate, projected day by day. It is deliberately not proportional to the Threshold met bar: a subnet that looks fuller today can still show a longer ETA.

It covers the conviction gate only and ignores the age gate, so a subnet less than a year old can show an ETA of 0 while still being years from eligible; read it next to the age. An ETA exists exactly when the gate is reachable. Only the best-placed hotkey counts, because the leader of that day is the one the chain would admit. Conviction converges towards the perpetually locked mass, because the decaying part matures and then melts away. That gives the gauge a ceiling, the leader's perpetually locked alpha / the bar × 100 (another holder's locks never mature into the leader's conviction), but that ceiling is measured against today's bar while the projection lets the bar climb, so a ceiling above 100% is necessary and not sufficient. With a ceiling below 100% the gate is never durably reachable and the status reads Stalled, even if a transient bump crosses it. The approach is concave, so a subnet with high conviction today but a ceiling barely above the gate reads slower than a less filled one with room to grow. The 3-year horizon is far enough out for the projection to settle, so "no crossing" really does mean never, with the locks as they stand. It assumes locks stay frozen and lets the bar rise with issuance alone, while burns and stake flows usually lower it, so the projection is deliberately on the pessimistic side; every sync recomputes it.

How much of the stake the ten largest holders own between them.

It is a fraction in 0..1, not a percentage, and it reads exactly 1 whenever the subnet has 10 holders or fewer. The denominator excludes the owner self-stake, so it measures the tradable distribution; the owner can still show up through its external delegations.