Glossary

What the leading challenger has actually put at risk: the realizable TAO value of the alpha they have locked. Bigger means a more committed challenger.

Shown at realizable value on purpose, because face value overstates the commitment on a thin pool. Only meaningful when the leader is an outsider, which is served alongside as a flag. Careful with the underlying field name, which says owner but carries the LEADER position, and the leader is not always the owner.

How much of the subnet the current leader of the ownership race has locked up, as a share of supply. Locking alpha is how a key stakes its claim to owning the subnet.

Despite the field name this is the LEADER's position, and the leader ("king") is not always the owner, so check `king_is_owner`, and never infer it by comparing `king` (a hotkey) to `owner` (a coldkey). The companion fields are king_conviction (raw score, never display it), owner_conviction_pct (share of the conviction battle, 100% = unchallenged) and total_conviction. Conviction is an alpha mass, not an abstract score, which is what makes it comparable to supply at all. It decays over time, but the chain does not keep it up to date on its own: the stored value only moves when something touches the lock, so the figure served here is one we roll forward to a pinned block, refreshed every few minutes. Perpetually locked alpha never loses mass and its conviction converges upward to that mass instead. Two half-lives drive it, today about 90 days for the unlock schedule and about 30 for maturation. Both are governance parameters and the maturation one has already been moved off its default (to a third of it), so read the two half-life fields served alongside rather than trusting those numbers. Note this gauge is measured against total supply while the takeover gate below is measured against the alpha held outside the pool: two neighbouring bars, two different denominators.

How concentrated the holders are, on a 0 to 100% scale. 0% means the stake is spread perfectly evenly, 100% means one holder owns everything. Lower is healthier.

Shares are per wallet, summed across every validator that wallet delegates to. The owner exclusion is per position, not per wallet: a position drops out only when the holder, the validator it is staked to and the subnet owner are the same coldkey, so the owner's delegations to outside validators are still counted. Most explorers publish the raw HHI rather than this min-normalised form, so the numbers are not comparable. Returns 0 below 2 holders. Recomputed on a 2-hourly cycle, so it can lag the live table, and if that read fails it holds its last good value rather than dropping to zero.

The alpha locked across every participant in the ownership race, shown both at face value and at what it would actually fetch if sold.

Perpetual locks never release their alpha; decaying locks give it back gradually. Realizable values are single AMM exits, so per-holder figures do NOT add up to the subnet total: use the subnet-level value for "everything sold at once". The fee used is a flat 0.05% rather than the subnet's own, which the chain stores per subnet and governance can change, so on a subnet whose fee has been moved the realizable figure is slightly off.

The smallest number of top holders who together own more than half of the stake. Lower means more concentrated.

Same owner exclusion as HHI. Returns 0 (not 1) for an empty or single-holder subnet.

All the alpha staked on the subnet, i.e. everything held outside the pool.

Careful with the word reserve: the pool's alpha reserve is the OTHER figure (see In Pool). This one is everything outside the pool, and it is broader than "what holders own": it INCLUDES the owner's locked and self-staked alpha, the alpha orphaned by past burns (a burn does not shrink it), and alpha the protocol itself bought through chain buys. Locking changes nothing here either, since a lock only blocks withdrawal and moves no tokens. The owner-excluded distribution behind HHI / Nakamoto / Top 10% is a separate calculation.

Two conditions must both hold before the chain will hand a subnet to the conviction leader: the subnet must be over a year old, and the TOTAL conviction locked on it (every holder combined, owner included) must reach 10% of its staked alpha. Threshold met is how full that second condition is.

Both gates are evaluated together, once per epoch rather than every block. The 10% divisor is fixed in the runtime, not a governance parameter, but the quantity it applies to is not fixed at all, so the bar moves under your feet: the chain mints alpha into the outstanding supply on every block of every subnet, emission-disabled ones included, which adds about 720 alpha a day to the bar on its own. Staking and unstaking move it too, in both directions, and measured over 11 days of mainnet the net drift came out at a median of +304 alpha a day across 123 subnets, rising on 82 of them and falling on 41. So a gauge that slips backwards while nobody unlocks is the normal case, not a bug. The age gate is a plain countdown and is usually already cleared. The bar can read above 100% for a while when a decaying lock is near its peak, without the gate being durably reachable; see the ceiling described under Time to takeover. Whether the chain actually executes the flip is a runtime question, so read `takeover_enforced`, which tracks the live runtime version rather than a hardcoded flag: while it is false the gates are computed but nothing happens, which makes this an armed race rather than an executed takeover. Mainnet passed the enabling runtime version, so it reads true today. Even then the flip is not automatic: the chain also requires the leader to resolve to a real wallet, different from the current owner, and eligible to hold a slot on the subnet.

A one-word verdict on the ownership race: whether the gate can ever be reached with the locks as they stand, whether both gates are already satisfied, and whether the chain would act on it.

Stalled is not the same as "far away": it means waiting cannot get there, only a new lock can, whether because the perpetual mass tops out under the bar or because the bar outruns it. A subnet can sit above 100% on the Threshold-met bar without being eligible, and today that is ALWAYS the age lock holding it back. Even when eligible, the flip only happens at the next epoch, only if enforcement is on, and only if the leader is a different wallet from the current owner.

How long the current locks would need to fill the 10% conviction gate, projected day by day. Deliberately NOT proportional to the Threshold-met bar: a subnet that looks fuller today can still show a longer ETA.

It covers the conviction gate ONLY and ignores the age gate, so a subnet less than a year old can show an ETA of 0 while still being years from eligible; read it next to the age. It is also the same information as the reachable flag, by construction: an ETA exists exactly when the gate is reachable. Conviction converges towards the perpetually locked mass, because the decaying part matures and then melts away. That gives the gauge a ceiling (gate_ceiling_pct = perpetual locked / threshold × 100), but the ceiling is measured against TODAY's bar while the bar itself climbs, so above 100% is necessary and not sufficient: 39 subnets currently sit above it and 22 of them get overtaken inside the 3-year scan at the drift measured over the last 11 days. Below 100% the gate is never durably reachable and the status reads Stalled, even if a transient bump crosses it. The approach is concave, so the closer the ceiling sits to the threshold the slower the final stretch, and a subnet with high conviction today but a ceiling barely above the gate reads slower than a less-filled one with room to grow. The 3-year horizon is about 36 maturity half-lives at the current setting, far enough out that the projection has settled, so "no crossing" really does mean "never, with the locks as they stand"; move that half-life back to its default and the margin shrinks fourfold. It assumes locks stay frozen, and it models the bar as rising at the issuance rate alone, which is the only mechanical term: real stake flows add to it or subtract from it, so the projection is deliberately on the pessimistic side. Every sync recomputes it and the value drifts.

How much of the stake the ten largest holders own between them.

It is a fraction in 0..1, not a percentage, and it reads exactly 1 whenever the subnet has 10 holders or fewer. The denominator excludes the owner self-stake, so it measures the tradable distribution; the owner can still show up through its external delegations.